USE OF THE EXPERT’S CATEGORICAL AND PROBABILISTIC CONCLUSIONS AS EVIDENCE BY THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
Author(s): Palieva O.N., Paliev V.B., Fomenko I.V.
Rubric: Relevant aspects of criminal law, criminal proceedings and criminalistics
DOI: 10.21777/2587-9472-2024-4-72-77
Release: 2024-4 (44)
Pages: 72-77
Keywords: expert opinion, expert conclusions, probabilistic conclusions, categorical conclusions, assumptions, relevance, admissibility, sufficiency, judicial practice
Annotation: The article examines aspects of research, assessment and use of expert opinions at the trial stage, which have categorical and probabilistic conclusions. The authors indicate that at various stages of criminal procedural activity, the legislator has approached the use of probabilistic conclusions in judicial practice differently. The views of theorists and practitioners do not have an unambiguous approach to this issue. The case law demonstrates that probabilistic conclusions can be used in criminal evidence. However, they ac- quire evidentiary value only if the general requirements of relevance, admissibility and reliability are met, as well as taking into account the special requirement of scientific validity and in conjunction with other evidence. The point of view on the inadmissibility of a probabilistic expert conclusion as evidence in a court verdict will remain dominant for a long time. At the same time, there will be an excessive focus on categorical judgments that do not always reflect the reality and validity of the conclusions made. It seems that in such a situation, the legislator is obliged to clearly determine the admissibility or inadmissibility of an expert’s probabilistic conclu- sion as evidence in a court verdict. In the text of the article, the Russian Federation is abbreviated as RF.
Bibliography: Palieva O.N., Paliev V.B., Fomenko I.V. USE OF THE EXPERT’S CATEGORICAL AND PROBABILISTIC CONCLUSIONS AS EVIDENCE BY THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE // Journal of Legal Sciences. – 2024. – № 4 (44). – С. 72-77. doi: 10.21777/2587-9472-2024-4-72-77